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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
What  is  the  relationship  between  venture  capitalists’  selection  of investment  targets  and  the  effects  of
these  investments  on the  patenting  performance  of portfolio  companies?  In  this  paper,  we  set  out  a
modelling  and  estimation  framework  designed  to discover  whether  venture  capital  (VC)  increases  the
patenting  performance  of  ﬁrms  or whether  this  effect  is a consequence  of prior  investment  selection  based
on ﬁrms’  patent  output.  We  develop  simultaneous  models  predicting  the  likelihood  that  ﬁrms  attract  VC
ﬁnancing,  the  likelihood  that  they  patent,  and  the  number  of  patents  applied  for  and  granted.  Fully
accounting  for the  endogeneity  of  investment,  we  ﬁnd  that  the  effect  of  VC  on patenting  is  insigniﬁcant
or  negative,  in contrast  to the  results  generated  by  simpler  models  with  independent  equations.  Our
ﬁndings  show  that  venture  capitalists  follow  patent  signals  to invest  in  companies  with commerciallyeywords:
enture capital
atenting
election
viable  know-how  and  suggest  that  they  are  more  likely  to rationalise,  rather  than  increase,  the  patenting
output  of portfolio  ﬁrms.
© 2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).ignalling
nnovation
. Introduction
New ﬁrms can rarely rely on internal cash ﬂows in their pursuit
f entrepreneurial opportunities. Among the sources of external
nance available to entrepreneurs, venture capital (VC) can provide
ot only the ﬁnancial resources they require, but also assistance
o enhance the design, development, and performance of portfolio
ompanies (Lerner, 1995; Bergemann and Hege, 1998; Gompers
nd Lerner, 2001; De Clercq et al., 2006; Schwienbacher, 2008;
umming, 2010).
Among the different dimensions of entrepreneurial growth that
he literature has noted, a strong association has been identiﬁed
etween VC investments and innovation, often measured by the
rm’s patenting output. A prominent thesis is that venture cap-
talists improve investee ﬁrms’ innovative performance through
heir ability to ‘coach’ new businesses and to nurture them to pro-
uce greater technological output (Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Popov
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 1223 765330.
E-mail addresses: h.lahr@cbr.cam.ac.uk (H. Lahr), a.mina@jbs.cam.ac.uk
A. Mina).
1 Tel.: +44 1908 332648.
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2015.10.001
048-7333/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article uand Roosenboom, 2012). An alternative argument has received
relatively less attention as yet, although its validity may  lead to
a different conclusion: that venture capitalists are exceptionally
good at identifying new ﬁrms with superior technological capabili-
ties, which they see as the best investment opportunities. Seen from
this angle, the most distinctive trait of VC, and therefore the most
salient explanation for the stronger technological performance of
VC-backed ﬁrms relative to other ﬁrms, would be the venture capi-
talists’ superior selection capabilities (Baum and Silverman, 2004).
Venture capitalists face a resource allocation problem charac-
terised by high risk and strong information asymmetries. In order
to decrease these information asymmetries – given that potential
investees have little or no track records of market performance –
investors have to rely on other signals of ﬁrm quality. These include
the ex ante patenting performance of potential investees (Häussler
et al., 2012; Conti et al., 2013b; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013), so patent-
ing can be seen as an antecedent of VC investment decisions, as well
as a likely consequence. Disentangling the relationship between
VC investment and ﬁrms’ technological performance involves a
signiﬁcant theoretical as well as empirical challenge because of
endogeneity and reverse causation between the investment and
innovation processes.
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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niﬁcant during the venture capital boom in the late 1990s. However,
estimations of total factor productivity (TFP) growth reveal that
this was  not affected by VC investment, a result that contrasts with04 H. Lahr, A. Mina / Resea
This is an important problem, not only from a scholarly perspec-
ive but also from a policy viewpoint. Even though the VC sector
nances only a minority of new ﬁrms, it plays a very prominent
ole in policies designed to overcome ﬁnance gaps and to grow
ntrepreneurial, innovation-driven economies (OECD, 2014). This
ole has not gone unquestioned: critical issues have been raised
bout scale and skills in the demand and supply of venture ﬁnance
Nightingale et al., 2009), governance (Lerner, 2009), cyclicality
nd stage distribution of investments (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005;
umming et al., 2005; Lahr and Mina, 2014), and the overall returns
nd long-term sustainability of the VC investment model (Mason,
009; Lerner, 2011; Mulcahy et al., 2012). These make it even more
mportant to gain a clear and accurate understanding of the VC-
nnovation nexus.
In this paper we model the relation between VC and patenting
sing simultaneous equations to consider both the determinants
f VC investments, including patents as signals of ﬁrm quality, and
he effect of VC on ﬁrms’ post-investment patenting performance,
ontrolling for their prior performance. We  use data from an orig-
nal survey of 3669 US and UK companies. We  extract information
n the 940 ﬁrms that sought ﬁnance between the years 2002 and
004 and match these records with patent data extracted from
he European Patent Ofﬁce’s Worldwide Patent Statistical Database
PatStat) for the periods concurrent to and following the survey
ears. Controlling for other ﬁrm characteristics (e.g. size, age, R&D
xpenditure, and market size), we estimate simultaneous models
or (1) the likelihood that ﬁrms’ patenting activities predict VC
nvestments and (2) the likelihood that such investments lead to
atenting in the following period. We  employ a bivariate recur-
ive probit model and develop a simultaneous zero-inﬂated Poisson
odel for count data, using both to control for the endogenous
ature of the selection and coaching processes.
We demonstrate that, once we account for endogeneity, the
ffect of VC on the subsequent patenting output of portfolio compa-
ies is either negative or insigniﬁcant. These results indicate that,
hile venture capitalists positively react to patents as signals of
ompanies with potentially valuable knowledge, conﬁrming the
selection’ hypothesis, there is no evidence of a positive effect of VC
nvestment on ﬁrms’ subsequent patenting performance. It is plau-
ible that VC will positively inﬂuence other aspects of new business
rowth (i.e. commercialisation, marketing, scaling up, etc.), but the
ontribution of VC does not seem to involve increasing investee
rms’ technological outputs. Importantly, the fact that the techno-
ogical productivity of a ﬁrm may  slow down after VC investment
oes not imply that the ﬁrm would be better off without VC: on the
ontrary, an insigniﬁcant or negative effect of VC on ﬁrm patenting
uggests that venture capitalists rationalise technological searches
nd focus the ﬁrm’s ﬁnite resources, including managerial atten-
ion, on the exploitation of existing intellectual property (IP) rather
han further technological exploration.
This paper advances our understanding of the ﬁnancing of
nnovative ﬁrms by modelling the determinants of investment
hoices by VC and the patenting output of their portfolio compa-
ies at the time of and after VC investment. In so doing, the paper
lso introduces an original methodology that can disentangle the
ndogenous relationship between VC and patenting efﬁciently, and
as the potential for further uses in treating analogous theoretical
tructures.
. VC investments and patenting: Theory and evidenceInvestments in small and medium-sized businesses, and in par-
icular new technology-based ﬁrms, pose speciﬁc challenges to
apital markets because they involve high risks and strong infor-
ation asymmetries (Lerner, 1995; Hall, 2002). From an investor’slicy 45 (2016) 303–318
viewpoint, the economic potential of these ﬁrms is difﬁcult to
assess given their short history and the lack of external sig-
nals about their quality (e.g. audited ﬁnancial statements, credit
ratings), or of market feedback about new products and services
at the time of investment. Only few investors are able and will-
ing to back these businesses. They do so with the expectation of
satisfactory returns by applying a speciﬁc set of capabilities, and
often sector-speciﬁc business knowledge, that enable them to make
better choices relative to competing investors, handle technolog-
ical and market uncertainty, and actively inﬂuence the outcome
of their investments (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers, 1995; Hellmann,
1998; Gompers and Lerner, 1999, 2001; Kaplan and Strömberg,
2003, 2004).
In the extant studies that have addressed the links between VC
and innovation, one stream has focused on the ability of venture
capitalists to assist portfolio companies by giving them formal and
informal advice, thus adding value in excess of their ﬁnancial con-
tributions (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Sapienza, 1992; Busenitz
et al., 2004; Park and Steensma, 2012). A second and more recent
stream has instead emphasised the ability of VCs to use patents
as signals of ﬁrm quality and to make superior choices, relative to
other investors, among the investment options that are available
to them. If what matters for the subsequent performance of portfo-
lio companies is the quality of the initial investment decision, the
source of venture capitalists’ competitive advantage rests on their
selection capabilities, deﬁned as their ability to identify the investee
companies with the greatest growth potential (Dimov et al., 2007;
Yang et al., 2009; Fitza et al., 2009; Park and Steensma, 2012). In
the following two sections we review the arguments and evidence
behind these two perspectives.
2.1. The effects of VC on patenting
The proposition that venture capitalists are able to increase
ﬁrm value beyond the provision of ﬁnancial resources has gained
considerable support in the literature (Gorman and Sahlman,
1989; Sahlman, 1990; Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Lerner, 1995;
Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2004; Croce et al., 2013), and is especially
clear when they are compared, for example, to banks in the supply
of external ﬁnancing to small and medium-sized enterprises (Ueda,
2004). Venture capitalists can take active roles in many aspects
of the strategic and operational conduct of their portfolio ﬁrms,
including the recruitment of key personnel, business plan devel-
opment, and networking with other ﬁrms, clients and investors,
often on the basis of in-depth knowledge of the industry (Florida
and Kenney, 1988; Hellmann and Puri, 2000, 2002; Hsu, 2004;
Sørensen, 2007).
Several studies ﬁnd links between VC investments and ﬁrms’
patenting performance, and generally interpret a positive associa-
tion between the two  as a result of the ‘value-adding’ or ‘coaching’
effects of VC. One of the most prominent studies on this topic is
Kortum and Lerner’s (2000) paper, in which the authors model and
estimate a patent production function in an investment framework.
Aggregating patent numbers by industry, they ﬁnd a positive and
signiﬁcant effect of VC ﬁnancing on (log) patent grants1. Ueda and
Hirukawa (2008) show that these ﬁndings become even more sig-1 Both patenting and venture funding could be related to unobserved techno-
logical opportunities, thereby causing an upward bias in the coefﬁcient on venture
capital, but regressions that use information about policy shifts in venture fund
legislation to construct an instrumental variable also show positive impacts of VC
investments on patenting (Kortum and Lerner, 2000).
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hemmanur et al.’s (2011) study, which reveals a positive effect
f VC on TFP. Popov and Roosenboom (2012) also ﬁnd similar posi-
ive, although weaker, results for such effects in European countries
nd industries. Further estimations of autoregressive models for
FP growth and patent counts by industry seem to suggest that
FP growth is positively related to future VC investment, but there
s weaker evidence that VC investments precede an increase in
atenting at the industry level, and there are indications that lagged
C investments are often negatively related to both TFP growth and
atent counts (Hirukawa and Ueda, 2008).
Empirical ﬁrm-level studies on venture capital investments
end to conﬁrm the existence of a positive relation between VC
nd patenting performance (Arqué-Castells, 2012; Bertoni et al.,
010; Zhang, 2009). This pattern is not only found for indepen-
ent but also for corporate venture capital (Alvarez-Garrido and
ushnitsky, 2012; Park and Steensma, 2012). Lerner et al. (2011)
stimate various models, including Poisson and negative bino-
ial models, for patents granted and patent citations in ﬁrms
hat experienced private equity-backed leveraged buyouts (LBOs).
hey ﬁnd an increased number of citations for patent applications
ost-LBO and no decrease in patent originality and generality after
uch investments. Patent counts do not seem to vary in a uni-
orm direction. A study by Engel and Keilbach (2007) found that
C-backed ﬁrms apply for ten times as many patents as matched
on-VC backed ﬁrms: the authors use propensity and balanced
core matching to compare venture-funded to non-VC funded Ger-
an  ﬁrms in terms of their technological outputs and growth,
lthough this difference was only weakly signiﬁcant. Caselli et al.
2009) use a similar matching procedure to assess the difference
n the patenting and growth performances in the venture-backed
POs of Italian ﬁrms. Their results show a higher average number
f patents in the venture-backed ﬁrms than in their control group.
mportantly, however, none of these studies provides solutions to
he fundamental problem of the endogeneity of investment relative
o ﬁrms’ technological performance2.
.2. Investment selection
The second hypothesis that might explain the correlation
etween VC investment and ﬁrms’ technological performance is
hat venture capitalists have distinctive selection capabilities. This
mplies a modelling framework in which the innovative proﬁles of
otential investee ﬁrms affect the probability that they receive VC
nvestment. From this perspective, patents can function as signals
o investors about ﬁrm quality (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Mann
nd Sager, 2007; Häussler et al., 2012; Audretsch et al., 2012; Conti
t al., 2013a,b; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013).
There are several dimensions to the investment evaluation pro-
ess employed by venture capitalists (Shepherd, 1999), and there
s growing interest in the technological determinants of venture
nancing. Baum and Silverman (2004) explored the links between
C ﬁnancing, patent applications, and patents granted. Their ﬁnd-
ngs suggest that the amount of VC ﬁnance obtained depends on
agged patents granted and applied for, R&D expenditures, R&D
mployees, government research assistance, the amount of sector-
peciﬁc venture capital, horizontal and vertical alliances, and the
nvestee ﬁrm being a university spin-off. Age is negatively related
o venture capital, as are net cash ﬂows, diversiﬁcation, and indus-
2 To the best of our knowledge, Croce et al. (2013) is the closest attempt to date
o  address sample selection problems in the context of the value-added hypoth-
sis.  However, this interesting study does not consider any innovation indicators
nd its analysis of portfolio companies’ productivity growth is limited by the use
f  only a small set of basic ﬁrm characteristics. Our paper does not focus on TFP
stimates—instead we  explore in some detail the technological output of ﬁrms in
elation to entrepreneurial ﬁnance decisions.licy 45 (2016) 303–318 305
try concentration. Mann and Sager (2007) conﬁrm the positive
impact of patenting on VC-related performance variables, including
the number of ﬁnancing rounds, total investment and exit status.
Similarly, a start-up ﬁrm’s prior patenting attract greater amounts
of VC funds in Cao and Hsu’s (2011) study of venture-backed ﬁrms.
Häussler et al. (2012) elaborate on Spence’s (2002) signalling
theory to argue that the founders of entrepreneurial ﬁrms are bet-
ter informed about the quality of the venture than are potential
investors, and that they use patents as communication devices to
bridge this information gap. Patents are effective signals of qual-
ity on the grounds that, as they are produced at a cost (in this
case the fees associated with the patenting process), low-quality
agents will tend to be weeded out. Their empirical analysis con-
ﬁrms that patent applications have a positive effect on the hazard
rate of VC funding in a sample of British and German biotech com-
panies. These ﬁndings resonate with prior results presented by
Engel and Keilbach (2007), whose probit modelling of VC invest-
ment reveals a positive association with patents and the founder’s
human capital. Along a similar line of enquiry – albeit set in a
broader Penrosian framework than that used by Häussler et al.
(2012) – Hsu and Ziedonis (2013) analyse VC-ﬁnanced start-ups
in the US semiconductor sector. They show that, by bridging infor-
mation asymmetries, patents increase the likelihood of obtaining
initial capital from a prominent VC, and have positive effects on
fundraising and IPO pricing (conditional on IPO exit).
By bringing these streams of contributions together, we aim to
answer the question: Does venture capital positively contribute to
the patenting performance of ﬁrms or is it a consequence of ven-
ture capitalists’ ability to identify the best companies at the time of
investment? Results based on ﬁrm-level information are mixed,
which suggests that positive ﬁndings could be at least partially
driven by VC’s selection of companies on the basis of their current
patent output. We  can only shed light on the effects of coaching
vis-à-vis the selection function of VC if we take into account the
endogeneity of the relation between VC investment and the tech-
nological performance of ﬁrms. Our research strategy is therefore to
model, test, and evaluate in a simultaneous setting (1) the effect of
VC on the patenting performance of portfolio ﬁrms post investment
and (2) the effect of ﬁrms’ patenting performance on the probability
of attracting VC.
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Data
This paper builds on a unique comparative survey of U.K. and U.S.
businesses carried out jointly by the Centre for Business Research
at the University of Cambridge and the Industrial Performance Cen-
ter at MIT  in 2004–2005. The basis for the sampling was the Dun &
Bradsheet (D&B) database, which contains company-speciﬁc infor-
mation drawn from various sources, including Companies House,
Thomson Financial, and press and trade journals3. The sample
covered all manufacturing and business service sectors, and was
stratiﬁed by sector and employment size (10–19; 20–49; 50–99;
100–499; 500–999; 1000–2999; and 3000+), with larger propor-
tions taken in the smaller size bands, as in both countries the
vast majority (over 98%) of ﬁrms employ fewer than 100 people.
The data were collected via telephone surveys between March and
November 2004 (response rates: 18.7% for the U.S. and 17.5% for
3 The choice of the Dun & Bradstreet database was  motivated by its broad coverage
of small ﬁrms, which are key for studying venture capital investments. Good cover-
age of SMEs is also the reason why the European Central Bank uses this database for
its survey on the access to ﬁnance of SMEs in the euro area (SAFE); see http://www.
ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/surveys/sme/html/index.en.html.
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which ﬁrms ﬁrst decide whether to use patenting as a suitable
IP protection strategy and then produce patents according to a
Poisson or similar distribution (see Fig. 1). Following this logic,
4 Less surprisingly, for patent grants the proportion of ﬁrms that start receiv-
ing grants compared with those that stop after receiving at least one grant in the
previous period is higher for VC-funded ﬁrms.
5 Inclusion of lagged dependent variables also helps to account for unobserved06 H. Lahr, A. Mina / Resea
he U.K.), followed by a postal survey of large ﬁrms in spring 2005
eading to a total sample of 1540 U.S. ﬁrms and 2129 U.K. ﬁrms.
We restrict our sample to ﬁrms that actively sought ﬁnance dur-
ng the two years prior to being interviewed, which produces a
orking sample of 940 ﬁrms (513 in the U.S. and 427 in the U.K.).
he survey lists VC funds and business angels as possible sources
f external ﬁnance. Despite some differences in stages and sizes
f investments, geographic proximity, and motivation for invest-
ents (Ehrlich et al., 1994), both venture capitalists and angels
pend considerable time with ﬁrms’ management teams, and make
ubstantial non-ﬁnancial contributions in addition to their ﬁnan-
ial commitments, including working hands-on in their day-today
perations (Kerr et al., 2014; Haines et al., 2003; Harrison and
ason, 2000). Since both formal and informal venture capitalists
an perform similar functions from our study’s viewpoint, we pool
bservations for these two classes of active investors, although
hen we perform robustness tests with separate samples, the
esults are consistent with our main analyses (Section 5.3). Infor-
ation about the event of a VC investment enters our models as an
ndogenous binary variable.
Firms answered the survey questions almost completely,
lthough minor gaps in the data would have prevented us from
sing about 10% of the survey responses. In order to avoid the
oss of observations due to missing values, we use random regres-
ion imputation to approximate them (Gelman and Hill, 2006). The
umber of such imputations is generally very low—always less than
% per variable. Where dependent variable values are missing, we
rop those observations.
Patent data are taken from the European Patent Ofﬁce’s (EPO)
orldwide Patent Statistical Database (PatStat), which contains
nformation on 68.5 million patent applications by 17.3 million
ssignees and inventors from 1790 to 2010. Since there are no ﬁrm
dentiﬁers available in PatStat, we match patent information to our
urvey data by ﬁrm name. We  consider ﬁrms’ global patent port-
olios, and count all applications to different patent authorities for
imilar or overlapping know-how as multiple patenting events. To
lign patent data with the three year period addressed in the sur-
ey, we count the number of patents applied for and granted within
 three-year period prior to the interview (calculated from exact
urvey response dates), and determine each ﬁrm’s patenting status
rom this number. More speciﬁcally, we use application ﬁling and
ublications dates for the ﬁrst grant of an application to determine
he timings of patenting events. For our dependent variables, we
ount applications and grants for the whole post-survey period in
rder to capture the long-term effects of VC investment. Finally,
e include a dummy  variable for the ﬁrm being based in the US or
he UK to control for different propensities to patent – and likeli-
ood of grant – in different domestic institutional environments.
e abstain from using forward citation-weighted indicators for
atents, a control for patent quality that is especially useful in stud-
es of performance, because such citations may  be affected by the
ikelihood of investment, and may  thus introduce a further source
f endogeneity into this analytical context that would be important
o avoid.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for our sample ﬁrms’ patent-
ng activities and our independent variables. 146 ﬁrms from our
ample applied for patents during the three-year survey period (t),
nd 168 ﬁled patent applications in the next period (t + 1). We iden-
iﬁed patent grants in 115 and 141 ﬁrms in these respective periods.
6 ﬁrms gained venture capital or business angel ﬁnancing in about
qual proportions in the two years prior to the survey. A simple
ross-tabulation of indicators for VC ﬁnancing and for patenting
ctivity at t (see Table 2) highlights the strong link between ven-
ure capital and patenting. It shows that 56.2% of VC-ﬁnanced ﬁrms
pplied for patents in any of the periods, whereas only 18.2% of
hose without VC funding did so. But this picture begins to looklicy 45 (2016) 303–318
different when we  consider changes in the patenting status across
periods. In the non-VC ﬁnanced group, ﬁrms seem to start patenting
at time t + 1 more often than they stop applying after patenting at
time t. In contrast, the numbers of ﬁrms in the VC-ﬁnanced group
that start patenting at time t + 1 balance those that discontinue
their patenting activities after period t4. Including additional con-
trol variables in our multivariate analyses gives us a much more
precise assessment of these state transitions.
The inclusion of explanatory variables builds on prior studies
into the relationship between VC and patenting, which have often
used a very limited number of co-determinants, sometimes only
R&D expenditures. We extend the scope of the relevant predictors
for the propensity to patent, of which R&D intensity is the preferred
choice according to standard practice in the literature (Scherer,
1965, 1983; Pakes and Griliches, 1980; Pakes, 1981; Hausman et al.,
1984). Since prior research has used various measures for this
intensity, including the log of R&D expenditures, R&D expendi-
tures scaled by size variables, or the number of R&D employees,
we choose a suitable combination of these indicators. We  proxy for
size by taking the logarithm of employment and control for R&D
intensity by including the percentage of R&D staff and a dummy
indicating the presence of R&D expenditures. This allows us to
avoid the use of multiple size-dependent measures, since variables
enter the expected mean in Poisson speciﬁcations multiplicatively.
Further variables control for age, country and industry. Following
Scherer (1983), we use the amount of international sales to measure
market size and control for industry concentration by the number of
competitors. We  measure CEO education by a dummy variable indi-
cating whether the CEO has a university degree or not. The length
of the average product development time in the ﬁrms’ principal
product market is also controlled for, since it arguably plays a role
in attracting investment (Hellmann and Puri, 2000). Finally, given
the highly cumulative nature of technical change (Dosi, 1988) we
include lagged patent applications and grants as proxies for the
ﬁrm’s knowledge stocks that it uses to produce new patents5.
3.2. Models and estimation
The structure of ﬁrms’ patenting decisions presents several
econometric challenges. Previous research shows that the vast
majority of ﬁrms do not patent, which causes observations of zero
patents in a large proportion of ﬁrms leading in turn to model
instability and error distributions that do not meet the model’s
assumptions if these excess zeroes are not properly addressed
(Bound et al., 1984; Hausman et al., 1984). At the same time, unob-
servable heterogeneity is highly likely to be correlated between
VC investment and patenting performance: for example, ﬁrms
might disclose patenting activities to prospective investors, which
increases the likelihood that we  observe VC investments in com-
bination with more patenting in the future. When using VC
investment to explain patenting, this endogeneity complicates
model estimation and may  make it analytically intractable6.
We suggest that patenting involves a two-step process, inheterogeneity.
6 A similar challenge, also associated with mixed empirical evidence, char-
acterises studies of VC investments and the ﬁnancial performance of portfolio
companies. Confront, for example, Steier and Greenwood (1995) and Busenitz et al.
(2004) with Fitza et al. (2009), and Matusik and Fitza (2012).
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Table  1
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min  Max Description
Any applications in t + 1 0.179 0 0.383 0 1
Patent applications in t + 1 4.118 0 34.241 0 779 Number of patent applications by the ﬁrm in the period after
the  surveyAny  grants in t + 1 0.150 0 0.357 0 1
Patent grants in t + 1 2.746 0 30.337 0 889 Number of patent grants to the ﬁrm in the period after the
surveyAny  applications in t 0.155 0 0.362 0 1
Patent applications in t 3.266 0 25.347 0 526 Number of patent applications by the ﬁrm in the period three
years prior to the surveyAny  grants in t 0.122 0 0.328 0 1
Patent grants in t 1.176 0 9.972 0 273 Number of patent grants to the ﬁrm in the period three years
prior to the survey
VC  investment 0.102 0 0.303 0 1 The ﬁrm obtained formal or informal venture capital in the
three-year period prior to the survey
Age  (log) 2.937 2.996 0.858 0.693 5.720 The natural logarithm of the ﬁrm’s age in years.
Size  (log(employees)) 3.848 3.714 1.059 1.099 6.804 The natural logarithm of the number of employees in the most
recent ﬁnancial year
U.S.  ﬁrm 0.546 1 0.498 0 1 The ﬁrm has its headquarters in the United States. Dummy
variable
Medium-high tech manuf. 0.310 0 0.463 0 1 The ﬁrm is a medium-high tech manufacturing ﬁrm according
to the OECD (2005) Science, Technology and Industry
Scoreboard
Medium-low tech manuf. 0.381 0 0.486 0 1 The ﬁrm is a medium-low tech manufacturing ﬁrm
R&D  services & software 0.117 0 0.322 0 1 The ﬁrm is an R&D service or software ﬁrm.
Other  services 0.153 0 0.360 0 1 The ﬁrm is a service ﬁrm other than R&D or software
Other  industry 0.039 0 0.195 0 1 The ﬁrm operates under a SIC code not covered above
R&D  expend. (yes/no) 0.732 1 0.443 0 1 The ﬁrm has R&D expenditures. Dummy variable
R&D  staff 0.073 0 0.175 0 1 Full-time R&D staff as a proportion of total staff.
CEO  has a degree 0.637 1 0.481 0 1 The ﬁrm’s Chief Executive or MD  has a degree. Dummy variable
Market  size 1.747 2 0.912 0 3 Size of the ﬁrm’s market. Coded as ordinal 0 = local,
1  = regional, 2 = national, 3 = international, treated as cardinal
Competitors (log) 1.987 1.792 1.012 0 6.909 Number of companies that the ﬁrm regards as serious
competitors plus one, in logs
Product dev. time 0.971 1 1.048 0 4 Average time it takes to develop a new product from
conception to the market. Coded as ordinal 0 = less than 6
months to 4 = more than 5 years, treated as cardinal
Table 2
Venture capital and patenting status.
No VC (n = 844): Applications in t + 1 VC (n = 96): Applications in t + 1 No VC (n = 844): Grants in t + 1 VC (n = 96): Grants in t + 1
Applications in t No (%) Yes (%) No (%) Yes (%) No (%) Yes (%) No (%) Yes (%)
No 81.8 6.0 43.8 11.5 85.4 4.7 51.0 15.6
Yes  3.4 8.8 11.5 33.3 2.7 7.1 6.3 27.1
Notes. This table presents the fraction of ﬁrms in each present and future patenting status dependent on venture capital investment. Row entries are the number of ﬁrms
with  any number of patent applications at time t. Columns show the number of ﬁrms applying for or being granted any number of patents.
Fig. 1. Model framework. Notes. Dependent variables are venture capital investment at time t and the number of patent applications or grants at time t + 1. In the binary
bivariate case, “Patents (yes/no):” measures whether we observe any number of patents for the ﬁrm at time t + 1. In zero-inﬂated Poisson models that also include the number
of  patents at t + 1, this variable indicates ﬁrms’ latent patenting status.
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e model patenting activity as a binary variable that depends on
rm and industry characteristics and augment our models with an
ndogenous binary variable that indicates whether or not a ﬁrm
eceives venture capital ﬁnancing. Instead of relying on propen-
ity score matching or comparable algorithms to identify a control
roup of non-VC backed ﬁrms, we have the advantage that we can
ork with ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ data that are generated contem-
oraneously by the survey7. Our data allow us to identify ﬁrms that
ought external ﬁnance, and those of them that obtained venture
nance. The explicit consideration of ﬁnance-seeking behaviours,
sually neglected in the literature, strengthens the quality of our
ample and the precision of our results.
We estimate two sets of simultaneous equations: In the ﬁrst
et, which contains two probit equations for patenting and venture
apital investments, we ignore information about the number of
atents and treat ﬁrms’ patenting behaviours as binary outcomes.
n the second set we introduce the number of patents in a zero-
nﬂated Poisson model.
The patenting equation in the recursive bivariate system is
ati,t+1 = I
(
Xit0 + 1Patit + 2 ln (PatNit) + 1VCit + εit > 0
)
, (1)
here Patit is a dummy  variable indicating whether ﬁrm i applied
or one or more patents or, depending on context, was granted at
east one patent period t. PatNit denotes the number of patent appli-
ations or patents granted. The indicator function I(·) equals one if
he condition in parentheses holds and zero otherwise. Since patent
pplications and grants can be zero – in which case the natural log-
rithm would not exist – we set ln(PatNit) to zero and use a dummy
ariable (Patit) to indicate patenting status. Endogenous venture
apital investment is captured by an indicator variable (VCit), and
it represents exogenous variables. The simultaneously determined
enture capital investment is:
Cit = I
(
Zitˇ0 + ˇ1Patit + ˇ2 ln (PatNit) + it > 0
)
, (2)
here Zit is a vector of exogenous explanatory variables which can
ontain some or all of the elements in Xit. Endogeneity of venture
apital ﬁnancing is accounted for by allowing arbitrary correlation
etween the error terms. Since variance of error terms is not iden-
iﬁed in binary models, the error terms εit and it are normalised to
ave a variance of unity.
A similar simultaneous model structure can be used to predict
he number of patents. Since patent data show a large number of
on-patenting ﬁrms, we model this empirical regularity using a
ero-inﬂated Poisson distribution. In this model, ﬁrms self-select
nto the patenting regime, and a third equation models the number
f patent applications or grants produced according to a Poisson
istribution. As in Lambert’s (1992) zero-inﬂated Poisson model,
he number of patents is distributed as:
atNi,t+1{
0 with probability pit+ (1 − pit) e−it=
k with probability (1 − pit) e−it kit/k!, k = 1, 2, . . .
(3)
7 This approach differs from Park and Steensma’s (2012) and Conti et al.’s (2013b).
n  contrast to these studies, we have data on ﬁrms that received investment and ﬁrms
hat did not, because our sampling was not guided by VC investment events. This
nables us to specify an appropriate test for selection (investment) instead of a test
or  the type of investment a ﬁrm may  have received when all the ﬁrms in their sample
ave received some investments (i.e. where there is no counterfactual of ‘no VC
nvestment’). Conti et al. (2013a), instead, have no-VC investment counterfactuals
t their disposal, but their focus is different, as they are interested in the relative
ensitivity of VC and business angel investors to heterogeneous investment signals.
oreover, they opt for a more traditional two-stage least squares linear probability
odel to treat endogeneity of investment.licy 45 (2016) 303–318
The likelihood that a ﬁrm chooses not to patent in the next period
is
pit = I
(
Xit0 + 1Patit + 2 ln (PatNit) + 1VCit + εit
)
, (4)
while the conditional mean of the Poisson process in the patenting
state is
it = exp
(
Xitı0 + ı1Patit + ı2 ln (PatNit) + NVCit + ωit
)
(5)
A novel feature of our model is that a ﬁrm’s likelihood of obtain-
ing venture capital is determined by an additional equation:
VCit = I
(
Zitˇ0 + ˇ1Patit + ˇ2 ln (PatNit) +  it > 0
)
(6)
as in the bivariate Probit case above.
We allow for arbitrary contemporaneous correlation between
it and εit, as well as between it and ωit, which are assumed
to follow bivariate normal distributions. Specifying the model in
this way allows for correlation between heterogeneity in expected
means of patent counts, the decision to patent and VC ﬁnancing. The
variance of individual-level errors (ωit) introduces a free parame-
ter that accounts for over-dispersion in Poisson models (Miranda
and Rabe-Hesketh, 2006). Identiﬁcation in semiparametric mod-
els of binary choice variables often relies on exclusion restrictions
(Heckman, 1990; Taber, 2000)—in our parametric case, however,
the functional form is sufﬁcient for identiﬁcation. In fact, imposing
additional restrictions on our model could cause spurious results,
since variables included in the VC equation but excluded from the
patenting equations would affect the outcome equation through
VCit if those variables were not truly independent from patent-
ing. We  therefore choose the exogenous variables to be identical
in all equations (Xit = Zit). Section 5.4 describes additional results
obtained from robustness tests that use exclusion restrictions in
the patenting equation(s).
In the following section we  present the results of bivariate recur-
sive probit models for VC ﬁnancing and patenting (i.e., results
for the simultaneous estimation of Eqs. (1) and (2) and then the
results we obtain from the system of equations complete with the
zero-inﬂated Poisson model (i.e., Eqs. (3) to (6)), estimated by max-
imum simulated likelihood (Gouriéroux and Monfort, 1996; Train,
2009)8. We  also report results of zero-inﬂated Poisson models
that include information about the number of patents, but exclude
simultaneous VC investment as our baseline results for the com-
plete system of equations (see Table 5). As terms of comparisons
and to show how key results differ when endogeneity is not taken
into account, we  include results of independent (single-equation)
probit models as robustness checks (Table 6).
4. Results
We  ﬁnd that the correlations between venture capital invest-
ment and subsequent patenting are substantial and highly
signiﬁcant, ranging between 0.21 for (log) patent applications
and 0.26 for a dummy  variable measuring whether a ﬁrm was
granted any patents after receiving VC investment. This positive
link could be due to technological coaching or selection. As we con-
struct increasingly complete models for the relation between VC
investment and patenting, the coaching effect disappears. Table 3
presents the results from our simultaneous model that jointly pre-
dicts patenting and venture capital investment.
8 We use subscripts t and t + 1 to distinguish between the periods concurrent
to  and following the survey. We use 200 random draws in all models estimated
by  maximum simulated likelihood. Further estimation details, including likelihood
function and MSL  methodology, are available from the authors.
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Table  3
Patenting and VC investment—simultaneous equations.
Dependent variable in patenting equation Applications in t + 1 Grants in t + 1 Grants in t + 1
Model 1 2 3
Dependent variable in patenting equation Patenting (yes/no) VC investment Patenting (yes/no) VC investment Patenting (yes/no) VC investment
VC investment −0.673 (0.34)** −0.175 (0.52) −0.444 (0.37)
Patent  applications (log) 0.455 (0.12)*** −0.095 (0.08) 0.568 (0.13)*** −0.098 (0.08)
Patent applications > 0 1.059 (0.21)*** 0.609 (0.20)*** 1.635 (0.22)*** 0.614 (0.20)***
Patent grants (log) 0.534 (0.16)*** −0.170 (0.12)
Patent grants > 0 1.206 (0.22)*** 0.434 (0.23)*
Age (log) 0.083 (0.08) −0.344 (0.09)*** 0.010 (0.11) −0.344 (0.09)*** 0.088 (0.10) −0.342 (0.09)***
Size (log(employees + 1)) 0.155 (0.06)*** 0.197 (0.07)*** 0.058 (0.07) 0.213 (0.07)*** 0.027 (0.07) 0.206 (0.07)***
U.S. ﬁrm 0.053 (0.14) −0.334 (0.13)** 0.279 (0.17)* −0.327 (0.14)** 0.320 (0.18)* −0.332 (0.14)**
Medium-high tech manuf. 0.095 (0.29) −0.226 (0.29) −0.084 (0.34) −0.203 (0.30) −0.254 (0.27) −0.251 (0.28)
Medium-low tech manuf. −0.223 (0.30) −0.375 (0.29) −0.463 (0.35) −0.389 (0.29) −0.566 (0.28)** −0.400 (0.29)
R&D  services & software −0.131 (0.33) 0.271 (0.30) −0.152 (0.40) 0.276 (0.30) −0.260 (0.35) 0.267 (0.29)
Other  services 0.068 (0.32) −0.098 (0.31) −0.757 (0.40)* −0.127 (0.31) −0.782 (0.36)** −0.132 (0.31)
R&D  expend. (yes/no) 0.468 (0.18)*** 0.424 (0.21)** 0.318 (0.20) 0.439 (0.21)** 0.467 (0.21)** 0.425 (0.22)*
R&D staff (in %) 0.356 (0.35) 0.701 (0.33)** 0.755 (0.44)* 0.838 (0.32)*** −0.134 (0.44) 0.650 (0.33)**
CEO has a degree 0.145 (0.14) 0.363 (0.17)** −0.201 (0.16) 0.347 (0.17)** −0.214 (0.17) 0.344 (0.17)**
Market size 0.260 (0.09)*** 0.191 (0.09)** 0.319 (0.10)*** 0.203 (0.09)** 0.280 (0.11)*** 0.206 (0.09)**
Product dev. time 0.160 (0.06)*** 0.043 (0.07) 0.138 (0.06)** 0.055 (0.07) 0.120 (0.07) 0.045 (0.07)
Competitors (log) −0.125 (0.06)** −0.084 (0.08) −0.119 (0.06)* −0.087 (0.08) −0.203 (0.07)*** −0.075 (0.07)
Intercept −3.070 (0.46)*** −1.845 (0.44)*** −2.313 (0.54)*** −1.903 (0.43)*** −2.408 (0.52)*** −1.905 (0.44)***
Observations 940 940 940
Log-Likelihood −486.4 −454.7 −393.3
Chi-sq. test 354.1 296.1 374.8
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
(vit ,εit)
p-Value for  (Wald test) 0.010 0.130 0.002
Pseudo-R2 0.334 0.357 0.444
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activity is strongly associated with product market characteristics.
Firms that operate nationally or internationally are more likely to
engage in formal IP protection than local or regional ﬁrms. There is
9 If patenting was  to depend on ﬁrm age, we would expect a start-up effect early in
the  life of ﬁrms that are founded to exploit some technological opportunity. We tried
a  dummy  variable indicating whether a ﬁrm was only founded during the sample
period but found no inﬂuence on patenting activity.
10 The non-obviousness standard in U.S. patent law at the application stage has
been weakened, leading to the grant of patents on increasing numbers of trivialotes. This table presents bivariate recursive probit models for patent application
tandard errors are in parentheses.
igniﬁcance levels: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
.1. Patenting
Venture capital does not increase patenting activity
Table 3—ﬁrst column of Models 1–3)—rather, it decreases
he likelihood of a ﬁrm ﬁling patent applications after the invest-
ent, in contrast to prior ﬁrm level (e.g. Arqué-Castells, 2012)
nd industry level studies (e.g. Kortum and Lerner, 2000) that
ound positive associations. The effect on future patent grants is
nsigniﬁcant. Correlations of unobserved effects in the patenting
nd selection equations are positive, supporting our modelling
trategy.
We ﬁnd strong persistence in patenting, for both applications
nd grants. If ﬁrms patent in one period, it tends to do so in the
ext. An indicator for prior-period patenting is signiﬁcant in all
peciﬁcations, while applying for or receiving a large number of
atents in one period increases the likelihood of observing at least
ne patent in the next. These effects can be interpreted in two ways:
n the one hand, prior patenting can be a proxy for unobserved
eterogeneity between ﬁrms in their ability to produce innova-
ions (other variables in our models might not capture all aspects of
rms’ internal processes and external market characteristics that
ead to patenting behaviour). On the other hand, knowledge – in
he form of existing patents – is an input for new patents. Exist-
ng patents can signal the size of ﬁrms’ knowledge stocks, which
re otherwise difﬁcult to measure. As these productive capacity
tocks depreciate over time, it is reasonable to assume that recent
dditions to the patent stock are the best predictors of present
nd future patenting activities, which is essentially what we
nd.
Strong evidence of the productivity effects of R&D expenditures
s consistent with prior studies (Cohen, 2010). The percentage of
&D staff weakly predicts patenting activity, only showing posi-
ive coefﬁcients in model 2. Human capital – as measured by the
EO’s education – does not appear to increase the likelihood ofnt grants and for the likelihood of observing venture capital investments. Robust
patent applications or grants. Firm age does not seem to affect
patenting9, while ﬁrm size has a positive effect on future appli-
cations, but no effect on grants, as Bound et al. (1984) found. Other
variables do not explain the variations in patenting that size would
explain if they were excluded. Collinearity is low in our models
(variance inﬂation factors are well below 5), and dropping signif-
icant variables from the models does not signiﬁcantly change the
effect of size. Industry effects collectively explain patenting, but
on their own are only weak predictors. Signiﬁcant Wald tests con-
ﬁrm the importance of controlling for industry effects. However,
individual effects are rarely signiﬁcant in our patenting models,
as might be expected, since our estimations include detailed ﬁrm-
level variables such as R&D and human capital. Unsurprisingly,
ﬁrms categorised as medium-high technology manufacturing tend
to apply for patents more often and obtain grants more frequently
than low-tech manufacturing and service ﬁrms.
Firms based in the U.S. exhibit a higher chance of success (in
terms of their applications being granted) than those located in
the U.K., an indication of known institutional differences between
the two  countries’ patenting regimes10. As expected, patentinginventions (Barton, 2003; Gallini, 2002). Structural differences in patenting pro-
cesses also affect patent opposition, re-examination and revocation rates, which
are signiﬁcantly higher for European and U.K. patents than for U.S. patents (Harhoff
and Reitzig, 2004; Graham et al., 2002).
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ittle difference between models for future applications and grants.
roducts that need long lead development times are more often
rotected by patents than those with a short time to market. Again,
his is reasonable from the viewpoint of a ﬁrm that needs more pro-
ection over longer R&D cycles. Finally, protection from imitation
hould be more prominent in industries characterised by intense
ompetition, although it is possible that ﬁrms in concentrated
arkets try to deter entry through the strategic use of patenting
Scherer, 1983). While Scherer (1983) only ﬁnds evidence for a link
etween industry concentration and the number of patents in mod-
ls that do not control for sectors, Baum and Silverman (2004) ﬁnd
ewer patents in concentrated industries. In contrast, the effect of
igh competition on patenting is negative in our models11.
.2. VC investment
A ﬁrm’s knowledge stock is a good predictor of venture capital
nvestment (see Table 3). Patenting attracts VC investments—more
peciﬁcally, it is the fact that a company is patent-active, not the
umber of applications or grants, that predicts VC investment.
esults are particularly strong for the application indicator, which
ignals strong innovation potential in portfolio companies.
R&D expenditures and R&D staff levels are both strong pre-
ictors of VC investments, as is the CEO’s education level. VC
nvolvement is more likely to be found in young ﬁrms, echoing the
ndings of prior research. Interestingly, however, venture capital
unds appear to invest in larger ﬁrms more often than in smaller
nes. This ﬁnding can be explained by interpreting size as a mea-
ure of investment risk, with very small ﬁrms typically being more
paque than larger ones. But it is also important to bear in mind that
ur sample includes ﬁrms with 10 to 1000 employees, and is there-
ore a sample of SMEs, as demanded for a study of VC investment.
ndustry effects point to a preference among venture investors for
&D services or software. Firms operating in larger (international)
arkets seem to be attractive investments, while coefﬁcients for
he intensity of competition are insigniﬁcant. Firms with long prod-
ct development times are neither more nor less likely to gain
enture capital12.
.3. Two-stage patenting—Patent counts, patenting, and venture
apital
The large number of zeroes in patent counts suggests that
atenting is a two-stage process, consisting of the binary decision
hether to use patenting as an IP protection strategy and a decision
bout how many patents to apply for. Two popular methods used to
odel the number of patents produced by such processes are based
n a zero-inﬂated Poisson distribution and a zero-inﬂated negative
inomial distribution. In order to further reﬁne our ﬁndings we
ntegrate a zero-inﬂated Poisson process in our system of equations,
hich now includes an equation for patent counts, one for patent-
ng, and one for venture capital investment. Table 4 presents the
esults for these estimations. For completeness, we  include results
11 We also test the hypothesis that competition is more relevant if the ﬁrm opera-
es  internationally, but do not ﬁnd that this interaction effect is signiﬁcant. Prior
tudies have found conﬂicting evidence on the impact of proﬁtability on patenting:
ertoni et al. (2010) show a positive relation between net cash ﬂow and patents,
hereas Baum and Silverman (2004) report a negative one. We  also tried using a
roxy for proﬁtability constructed from pre-tax proﬁts scaled by assets, but did not
nd signiﬁcant results. Consequently, we decided to drop this variable from our
odels, due to the large amount of missing values in survey responses on proﬁts.
12 Although collinearity is not a problem in these models, there is some correlation
etween product development time and R&D efforts, which causes development
ime to become a signiﬁcant predictor of VC investments if R&D variables are
ropped from the regression.licy 45 (2016) 303–318
from a model with only the patent counts and patenting equations
as Table 5, which provides the baseline for the full (three-equation)
model discussed in this section.
The positive effect on ﬁrms’ latent patenting states, which would
be expected if venture capitalists added to their patenting per-
formance, disappears across all models, while the negative effect
on the number of granted patents remains. Moreover – and as in
the simultaneous binary patenting models – the number of patent
applications drops after VC investments.
If we look at the number of patents being applied for or granted,
our results support the view that VC ﬁnance follows patent signals
to invest in companies with existing commercially viable know-
how. While the effect of VC investment on both the use of patents
and on their numbers seems negligible, VC has a negative impact on
patent grants and applications in some models. Venture capitalists
are attracted to ﬁrms that produce patents, but do not contribute to
the expansion of ﬁrms’ knowledge stocks—instead, they are likely
to shift ﬁrm resources from producing new patent applications to
exploiting existing knowledge.
Control variables for future patent counts behave mostly as
expected, and give further insights into ﬁrms’ patenting decisions.
While manufacturing ﬁrms and service ﬁrms appear – perhaps
counterintuitively – equally likely to patent (see model 1 in Table 3),
we ﬁnd that being a manufacturing or R&D ﬁrm increases the num-
ber of patent applications relative to other service ﬁrms (see model
1 in Table 4). The estimation algorithm for three simultaneous
equations picks the relevant equations for our two  R&D variables:
The existence of R&D programmes mainly predicts patenting in
general, while the proportion of R&D staff explains the number of
applications and grants awarded. In line with Baum and Silverman’s
(2004) results, we  ﬁnd that competition has a negative impact on
the decision to patent (in bivariate models in Table 3) and the
number of patents applied for or granted (in trivariate models in
Table 4). However, ﬁrms tend to protect their position in the mar-
ket by choosing to patent if their markets are large or have long
product development times.
Estimated model parameters provide support for modelling VC
investment, patenting, and the number of patents simultaneously.
In most of the models tested for patent applications and grants,
error correlations between the ﬁrst (VC) equation and the second
and third are substantial and signiﬁcant. External shocks lead-
ing to VC investment correlate with the likelihood to patent with
the expected positive sign (and negative sign for not patenting).
Estimated error correlations between VC investment and patent
numbers are again large and signiﬁcant. We also test model stabil-
ity by checking inﬂuential observations and cross-tabulations for
ﬁrms that start or stop their patenting activities depending on VC
investment, but ﬁnd no abnormalities.
5. Robustness tests
5.1. Independent equations
Our ﬁrst robustness check shows the advantages of our estima-
tion strategy over simpler alternatives. We  compare the results of
our simultaneous estimations with those obtained from indepen-
dent regressions for VC investment and patenting (see Table 6).
While there is no change in the VC equation, there is a striking
difference in the patenting equations (Table 6, columns 1–3): With-
out controlling for endogeneity, venture capital appears to increase
the likelihood of patents being granted. This arguably biased result
not only disappears in the simultaneous estimation strategy, but
the ﬁnding emerges that VC investment can reduce the likelihood
that ﬁrms apply for new patents in the period immediately after
the investment. We  can rule out that reduced effects of venture
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Table  4
Patenting, patent numbers, and VC investment.
Dependent variable in patenting equations Applications in t + 1 Grants in t + 1 Grants in t + 1
Model 1 2 3
Dependent variable Not patenting
(zero inﬂation)
VC investment Not patenting
(zero inﬂation)
VC investment Not patenting
(zero inﬂation)
VC investment
VC investment 0.186 (0.58) −0.976 (0.66) −0.815 (0.85)
Patent  applications (Log) −0.313 (0.22) −0.083 (0.08) −0.371 (0.18)** −0.103 (0.08)
Patent applications >0 −1.779 (0.51)*** 0.560 (0.20)*** −2.460 (0.43)*** 0.591 (0.20)***
Patent grants (Log) −0.586 (0.21)*** −0.173 (0.13)
Patent grants >0 −1.110 (0.27)*** 0.400 (0.24)*
Age (Log) −0.161 (0.12) −0.346 (0.10)*** −0.233 (0.12)* −0.343 (0.09)*** −0.111 (0.14) −0.338 (0.09)***
Size (log(employees + 1)) −0.167 (0.09)* 0.206 (0.07)*** −0.006 (0.08) 0.203 (0.07)*** 0.022 (0.10) 0.201 (0.07)***
U.S. ﬁrm 0.075 (0.20) −0.342 (0.13)** −0.400 (0.18)** −0.318 (0.14)** −0.351 (0.24) −0.342 (0.14)**
Medium-high tech manuf. −0.151 (0.44) −0.216 (0.29) −0.061 (0.38) −0.125 (0.30) 0.162 (0.36) −0.228 (0.29)
Medium-low tech manuf. 0.188 (0.45) −0.375 (0.29) 0.295 (0.39) −0.346 (0.30) 0.465 (0.34) −0.384 (0.29)
R&D  services & software 0.159 (0.49) 0.280 (0.30) −0.094 (0.48) 0.320 (0.30) −0.111 (0.42) 0.266 (0.30)
Other  services −0.652 (0.57) −0.107 (0.31) 0.634 (0.46) −0.074 (0.32) 0.711 (0.49) −0.116 (0.31)
R&D  expend. (yes/no) −0.613 (0.25)** 0.425 (0.21)** −0.288 (0.23) 0.440 (0.21)** −0.487 (0.28)* 0.432 (0.21)**
R&D staff (in %) 0.359 (0.51) 0.752 (0.32)** −0.485 (0.56) 0.881 (0.32)*** 1.123 (0.67)* 0.665 (0.33)**
CEO has a degree −0.282 (0.22) 0.345 (0.17)** 0.313 (0.22) 0.333 (0.17)* 0.355 (0.23) 0.341 (0.17)**
Market size −0.366 (0.14)*** 0.186 (0.09)** −0.299 (0.13)** 0.199 (0.09)** −0.388 (0.15)*** 0.194 (0.09)**
Product dev. time −0.176 (0.09)* 0.045 (0.07) −0.208 (0.10)** 0.052 (0.07) −0.226 (0.11)** 0.050 (0.07)
Competitors (Log) 0.109 (0.09) −0.081 (0.07) 0.148 (0.09) −0.087 (0.07) 0.164 (0.11) −0.082 (0.07)
Intercept 3.655 (0.70)*** −1.859 (0.44)*** 2.780 (0.62)*** −1.897 (0.44)*** 2.703 (0.65)*** −1.867 (0.44)***
Dependent variable Applications (number) Grants (number) Grants (number)
VC investment −0.780 (0.15)*** −0.136 (0.25) −0.886 (0.29)***
Patent applications (Log) 0.815 (0.05)*** 0.962 (0.05)***
Patent applications > 0 −0.160 (0.23) −0.411 (0.32)
Patent grants (log) 0.615 (0.06)***
Patent grants > 0 0.820 (0.23)***
Age (log) −0.032 (0.06) −0.441 (0.12)*** −0.042 (0.11)
Size  (log(employees + 1)) 0.017 (0.05) 0.186 (0.09)** 0.014 (0.10)
U.S.  ﬁrm 0.289 (0.10)*** −0.061 (0.15) 0.119 (0.19)
Medium-high tech manuf. −0.027 (0.34) −0.246 (0.27) 0.074 (0.40)
Medium-low tech manuf. 0.071 (0.36) −0.282 (0.32) 0.130 (0.44)
R&D  services & software −0.106 (0.34) −0.799 (0.30)*** −0.199 (0.45)
Other  services −1.136 (0.53)** −0.664 (0.46) −0.285 (0.59)
R&D  expend. (yes/no) 0.224 (0.42) −0.128 (0.41) 0.544 (0.32)*
R&D staff (in %) 1.215 (0.12)*** 0.850 (0.30)*** 1.059 (0.37)***
CEO has a degree −0.158 (0.17) 0.012 (0.34) 0.031 (0.20)
Market size −0.055 (0.09) 0.166 (0.11) −0.211 (0.12)*
Product dev. time 0.096 (0.05)** −0.103 (0.06) −0.054 (0.07)
Competitors (log) −0.210 (0.05)*** 0.042 (0.14) −0.239 (0.09)***
Intercept 0.259 (0.62) 0.914 (0.53)* 0.531 (0.53)
Var(ωit) 1.307 (0.12)*** 0.656 (0.10)*** 0.483 (0.07)***
(vit ,εit) −0.338 (0.24)* 0.076 (0.29) −0.092 (0.44)
(vit ,ωit) 0.290 (0.03)*** −0.108 (0.06)** 0.444 (0.11)***
Observations 940 940 940
Wald test 25697 25356 8424
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log-likelihood −968.4 −846.0 −762.8
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rotes. This table presents zero-inﬂated Poisson models for patent applications and
quation for venture capital investment. Robust standard errors (estimated using th
igniﬁcance levels: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
apital are caused by estimation uncertainty due to the additional
arameter for error correlation between equations. Wald tests of
he joint signiﬁcance of this correlation and the coefﬁcient of ven-
ure capital on patenting are signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level in
ll models in Table 3. The impact of positive error correlations can
e seen in the coefﬁcients for venture capital, which change consid-
rably when estimated simultaneously. Introducing cross-equation
orrelation also harmonises coefﬁcients for some variables across
odels and causes no major changes in the results for control
ariables.
Whether or not a ﬁrm obtains ﬁnance could have an impact
n its ability to start or sustain patenting activities. Since we per-
orm our regressions on a sample of ﬁrms that sought external
nance, rather than only on those that obtained it, we add a set of
obustness tests for this subsample. Results of separate regressionst grants during the period following the survey period, including an endogenous
dwich estimator) are shown in parentheses.
(not reported here) conﬁrm our ﬁndings in Table 3. However,
two small changes appear in the patenting equations. First, the
effect size of development time decreases slightly and loses its
signiﬁcance. Second, coefﬁcients on product market competition
all increase in magnitude, and the one predicting future applica-
tions becomes slightly signiﬁcant. Estimating our models on the
full dataset (including those 96 ﬁrms that did not obtain external
ﬁnance) has two advantages over the smaller sample. First, adding
these observations increases the statistical precision of our results.
Second, our ﬁndings are conservative, that is, the effect of obtaining
venture capital on patenting can be upward biased if it includes a
(positive) effect of obtaining any kind of ﬁnance, which would be
ignored if ﬁrms gaining no ﬁnance were excluded. In this sense, the
negative or insigniﬁcant coefﬁcients for venture capital represent
upper bounds for the ‘true’ effect.
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Table 5
Patenting and patent numbers—zero-inﬂated Poisson model.
Dependent variable in
patenting equations
Applications in t + 1 Grants in t + 1 Grants in t + 1
Model 1 2 3
Dependent variable Patents (number) Not patenting
(zero inﬂation)
Patents (number) Not patenting
(zero inﬂation)
Patents (number) Not patenting
(zero inﬂation)
VC investment −0.503 0.29)* −0.342 (0.22) −0.287 (0.22) −0.689(0.22)*** −0.696 (0.26)*** −1.130 (0.36)***
Patent applications (log) 0.805 (0.10)*** −0.448 (0.14)*** 0.990 (0.09)*** −0.419 (0.18)**
Patent applications > 0 −0.756 (0.34)** −1.150 (0.27)*** −0.916 (0.43)** −2.372 (0.37)***
Patent grants (log) 0.682 (0.11)*** −0.545 (0.16)***
Patent grants > 0 0.314 (0.30) −1.167 (0.24)***
Age (log) −0.098 (0.17) −0.177 (0.08)** −0.318 (0.17)* −0.143 (0.10) 0.143 (0.15) −0.078 (0.14)
Size  (log(employees + 1)) −0.125 (0.14) −0.150 (0.07)** 0.244 (0.14)* 0.019 (0.07) −0.138 (0.15) −0.015 (0.10)
U.S.  ﬁrm 0.401 (0.34) −0.073 (0.16) 0.583 (0.24)** −0.262 (0.16) 0.164 (0.17) −0.381 (0.22)*
Medium-high tech manuf. 0.260 (0.32) −0.159 (0.34) −0.510(0.58) −0.041 (0.37) −0.269 (0.46) 0.101 (0.34)
Medium-low tech manuf. 0.126 (0.36) 0.133 (0.34) −0.162 (0.59) 0.390 (0.37) −0.223 (0.47) 0.372 (0.33)
R&D  services & software 0.392 (0.40) 0.255 (0.38) −0.443 (0.62) 0.163 (0.42) −0.459 (0.47) −0.128 (0.40)
Other  services −0.498 (0.43) −0.232 (0.37) −0.415 (0.67) 0.726 (0.42)* −0.684 (0.62) 0.696 (0.45)
R&D  expend. (yes/no) 0.470 (0.39) −0.420 (0.19)** −0.100 (0.57) −0.284 (0.23) 0.389 (0.45) −0.484 (0.26)*
R&D staff (in %) 1.324 (0.72)* −0.020 (0.37) 0.752 (0.48) −0.474 (0.46) 1.551 (0.42)*** 1.292 (0.62)**
CEO has a degree −0.048 (0.28) −0.105 (0.16) −0.193 (0.32) 0.234 (0.18) 0.249 (0.35) 0.459 (0.25)*
Market size 0.055 (0.32) −0.243 (0.09)*** 0.487 (0.22)** −0.233 (0.11)** −0.157 (0.17) −0.336 (0.15)**
Product dev. time −0.225 (0.10)** −0.189(0.07)*** −0.072 (0.10) −0.161 (0.08)** −0.248 (0.09)*** −0.281 (0.11)**
Competitors (log) −0.163 (0.15) 0.101 (0.07) −0.307(0.18)* 0.046 (0.09) −0.568 (0.22)** 0.069 (0.14)
Intercept 1.674 (1.21) 3.451 (0.50)*** 0.498 (1.11) 2.385 (0.55)*** 1.974 (0.90)** 2.967 (0.65)***
Observations 940 940 940
Wald  test 2204.7 469.0 480.9
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log-likelihood −1537.8 −982.8 −819.3
Notes. This table presents zero-inﬂated Poisson models for patent applications and patent grants during the period after the survey. When comparing coefﬁcients from the
patenting equation with prior models for the likelihood to patent, all signs must be reversed as the “patenting” equation in this table predicts the likelihood of not patenting.
As  a robustness test, we  tried zero-inﬂated negative binomial models. Tests for overdispersion are all insigniﬁcant in these models, while Vuong tests against the alternative
hypothesis of a standard Poisson process are highly signiﬁcant. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance levels: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
Table 6
Patenting activity and venture capital investment—independent equations.
Patenting (yes/no) VC investment
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent variable Applications in t + 1 Grants in t + 1 Grants in t + 1 VC investment VC investment VC investment
VC investment 0.267 (0.20) 0.598 (0.20)*** 0.445 (0.25)*
Patent applications (Log) 0.513 (0.13)*** 0.627 (0.14)*** −0.094 (0.08)
Patent applications > 0 0.980 (0.22)*** 1.594 (0.23)*** 0.574 (0.20)***
Patent grants (log) 0.584(0.16)*** −0.166 (0.12)
Patent  grants > 0 1.182 (0.22)*** 0.393 (0.23)*
Age (log) 0.164 (0.07)** 0.073 (0.09) 0.167 (0.09)* −0.331 (0.09)*** −0.345 (0.09)*** −0.339 (0.09)***
Size (log(employees + 1)) 0.123 (0.06)** 0.028 (0.06) −0.012 (0.07) 0.202 (0.07)*** 0.205 (0.06)*** 0.193 (0.07)***
U.S. ﬁrm 0.132 (0.14) 0.344 (0.15)** 0.409 (0.18)** −0.327 (0.14)** −0.324 (0.14)** −0.323 (0.14)**
Medium-high tech manuf. 0.177 (0.32) −0.045 (0.34) −0.202 (0.27) −0.235 (0.29) −0.138 (0.29) −0.142 (0.29)
Medium-low tech manuf. −0.127 (0.32) −0.407 (0.35) −0.500 (0.28)* −0.405 (0.29) −0.351 (0.30) −0.347 (0.29)
R&D  services & software −0.235 (0.36) −0.229 (0.39) −0.352 (0.36) 0.259 (0.29) 0.312 (0.30) 0.312 (0.30)
Other  services 0.122 (0.34) −0.761(0.40)* −0.786 (0.36)** −0.127 (0.31) −0.084 (0.31) −0.099 (0.31)
R&D  expend. (yes/no) 0.430 (0.18)** 0.278 (0.20) 0.432 (0.22)** 0.419 (0.21)** 0.442 (0.21)** 0.464 (0.21)**
R&D staff (in %) 0.170 (0.36) 0.563 (0.46) −0.352 (0.46) 0.696 (0.33)** 0.878 (0.32)*** 0.874 (0.31)***
CEO has a degree 0.085 (0.14) −0.261 (0.16)* −0.288 (0.18) 0.335 (0.17)** 0.339 (0.17)** 0.362 (0.17)**
Market size 0.239 (0.09)*** 0.300 (0.10)*** 0.260 (0.11)** 0.198 (0.09)** 0.196 (0.09)** 0.214 (0.09)**
Product dev. time 0.163 (0.06)*** 0.136 (0.07)** 0.119 (0.08) 0.044 (0.07) 0.053 (0.07) 0.057 (0.07)
Competitors (log) −0.119 (0.06)* −0.111 (0.07)* −0.202 (0.08)*** −0.077 (0.07) −0.089 (0.07) −0.092 (0.07)
Intercept −3.311 (0.46)*** −2.448 (0.52)*** −2.588 (0.52)*** −1.883 (0.44)*** −1.887 (0.44)*** −1.889 (0.44)***
Observations 940 940 940 940 940 940
Log-Likelihood −252.3 −218.3 −159.3 −235.2 −237.1 −238.9
Chi-sq. test 235.7 186.4 265.8 111.0 114.6 101.5
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo-R2 0.428 0.451 0.599 0.241 0.235 0.229
Notes. This table presents probit models for the likelihood of observing any number of patent applications or grants, respectively, in columns 1–3 and probit models for the
likelihood of observing venture capital investments in columns 4–6. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance levels: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
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Table  7
Likelihood of becoming a merger or acquisition target.
Dependent variable M&A  Target M&A  Target M&A  Target M&A Target
Model 1 2 3 4
VC investment × applications (log) −0.013 (0.19)
VC  investment × grants (log) 0.303 (0.26)
VC  investment × (applications > 0) −0.433 (0.38) −0.406 (0.55)
VC  investment × (grant > 0) −0.215 (0.39) −0.700 (0.55)
VC  investment 0.619 (0.24)** 0.547 (0.23)** 0.619 (0.24)** 0.537 (0.23)**
Patent applications (log) 0.020 (0.09) 0.024 (0.11)
Patent applications > 0 0.509 (0.26)** 0.502 (0.27)*
Patent grants (log) 0.183 (0.12) 0.108 (0.13)
Patent grants > 0 0.184 (0.28) 0.302 (0.28)
Age  (log) −0.181 (0.09)** −0.191 (0.09)** −0.181 (0.09)** −0.190 (0.09)**
Size (log(employees + 1)) 0.266 (0.07)*** 0.257 (0.06)*** 0.266 (0.07)*** 0.257 (0.06)***
U.S. ﬁrm −0.124 (0.15) −0.143 (0.15) −0.125 (0.14) −0.145 (0.15)
Medium-high tech manuf. −0.157 (0.33) −0.134 (0.33) −0.157 (0.33) −0.171 (0.33)
Medium-low tech manuf. −0.257 (0.34) −0.234 (0.34) −0.258 (0.34) −0.258 (0.34)
R&D  services & software −0.289 (0.37) −0.294 (0.36) −0.292 (0.36) −0.278 (0.36)
Other  services −0.525 (0.37) −0.514 (0.37) −0.525 (0.37) −0.527 (0.37)
R&D  expend. (yes/no) −0.507 (0.18)*** −0.474 (0.18)*** −0.506 (0.18)*** −0.475 (0.18)***
R&D staff (in %) 0.218 (0.44) 0.133 (0.46) 0.216 (0.44) 0.127 (0.46)
CEO  has a degree 0.132 (0.17) 0.150 (0.18) 0.133 (0.17) 0.146 (0.18)
Market size 0.119 (0.08) 0.129 (0.08) 0.118 (0.08) 0.139 (0.08)*
Product dev. time 0.072 (0.08) 0.067 (0.08) 0.072 (0.08) 0.066 (0.08)
Competitors (log) −0.055 (0.08) −0.051 (0.08) −0.055 (0.08) −0.050 (0.07)
Intercept −2.004 (0.43)*** −1.958 (0.42)*** −2.001 (0.43)*** −1.952 (0.43)***
Observations 940 940 940 940
Log-Likelihood −170.713 −171.065 −170.711 −170.518
Chi-sq. test 65.850 64.510 66.040 65.380
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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.2. Sample attrition bias
Sample attrition can be a problem if ﬁrms disappearing in period
 + 1 are systematically those for which venture capital investment
ad a positive effect on patenting. To limit the risk of attrition bias
e investigate the merger and acquisition history of the ﬁrms in our
ample by retrieving the relevant records from Thomson Reuters’
DC Platinum database. We  use this information to estimate the
robability that ﬁrms are acquired depending on whether they
atent and whether they receive VC funding. Table 7 shows that
rms are more likely to be acquired if they patent in period t and if
hey experience VC investment. This result is not surprising since
cquirers may  follow the same patent signals that cause venture
apitalists to invest—or may  even be venture capitalists themselves.
ote, however, that the interaction effects for VC investment and
atenting are not signiﬁcant. Sample attrition due to mergers and
cquisitions, if these ﬁrms actually leave the sample, is thus unlikely
o systematically reduce the measured effect of VC on patenting.
After inspecting the M&A  records in the SDC database, if a ﬁrm
s the target of any kind of transaction, we correct the number of
atent applications and grants in the following way. If a ﬁrm retains
ts identity and remains active under its name in the sample, we
eep the original number of patents. An example of this type of
ransaction is a leveraged buyout, in which the ﬁrm’s management
cquires the ﬁrm, but the operating business remains unchanged.
f, instead, the ﬁrm is merged into the acquirer, we check whether
t is still patenting at the original location, but under the acquirer’s
ame, and if this is the case we add these patents to the sample. If
he ﬁrm disappears as a legal entity after the merger, we add all the
cquirer’s patents to the original ﬁrm’s patents, which then estab-
ishes an upper boundary for the ﬁrms’ patenting activity in t + 1. Of
28 transactions we identiﬁed, we adjusted the patent application
r grant numbers for 15 ﬁrms. The results of the binary models pre-
ented in Table 8 are unchanged, while those of the zero-inﬂated
oisson models presented in Table 9 show an insigniﬁcant effect of 0.151 0.152
VC on patenting in models 1 and 3, as one might conﬁdently expect
after attributing merged ﬁrms’ technological outputs into those of
acquiring ﬁrms.
5.3. Formal vs. informal venture capital
Pooling formal and informal VC investments in our model may
affect results if the two  classes of investors behave differently in
relation to the technological proﬁles of their investee ﬁrms. Out of
96 ﬁrms that obtain VC ﬁnancing in our sample, 66 ﬁrms receive
formal VC funding, while 41 ﬁrms attract VC investors. We  there-
fore disaggregate formal VC investments from those of informal
venture capitalists (such as business angels) in Table 10, but ﬁnd
the results for the two  sub- samples to be very similar. Effects of VC
involvement are negative in both cases, albeit insigniﬁcant, while
the effect of formal VC on patenting seems to be more negative
than that of informal VC. While these effects do not seem to differ
between types of investors, their lack of signiﬁcance is an expected
consequence of the reduced number of observations in each binary
model estimation.
It should also be pointed out that the effects observed in Table 10
may  be due to the fact that the control groups for ﬁrms that gained
formal (or informal) venture capital include ﬁrms ﬁnanced by infor-
mal  (or formal) venture capital. Hence, we would (to some extent)
be comparing ﬁrms receiving formal and informal venture capi-
tal and not, for example, ﬁrms gaining formal venture capital with
those receiving neither type of investment. If we exclude ﬁrms
funded by informal VC from the control group for the formal VC
models, and vice versa, we ﬁnd that these effects remain insigniﬁ-
cant and qualitatively unchanged from those presented in Table 10.
These robustness checks, which take into account the type of VC
investor, contrast with Conti et al.’s (2013a) results, where busi-
ness angels are found not to be as sensitive as VC to patent signals,
but are consistent with results presented by Audretsch et al. (2012),
whose estimations of probit models for the probability of receiving
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Table 8
Patenting and VC investment—simultaneous equations, adjusted for M&A.
Dependent variable in patenting equation Applications in t + 1 Grants in t + 1 Grants in t + 1
Model 1 2 3
Dependent variable in patenting equation Patenting (yes/no) VC investment Patenting (yes/no) VC investment Patenting (yes/no) VC investment
VC investment −0.758 (0.35)** −0.271 (0.51) −0.489 (0.35)
Patent  applications (log) 0.467 (0.13)*** −0.092 (0.08) 0.561 (0.13)*** −0.098 (0.08)
Patent  applications > 0 1.044 (0.21)*** 0.607 (0.20)*** 1.582 (0.22)*** 0.622 (0.20)***
Patent grants (log) 0.523 (0.16)*** −0.170 (0.12)
Patent  grants > 0 1.166 (0.22)*** 0.445 (0.23)*
Age (log) 0.055 (0.08) −0.348 (0.10)*** −0.005 (0.11) −0.346 (0.09)*** 0.069 (0.10) −0.345 (0.09)***
Size (log(employees + 1)) 0.166 (0.06)*** 0.199 (0.07)*** 0.081 (0.07) 0.213 (0.07)*** 0.058 (0.07) 0.205 (0.07)***
U.S. ﬁrm 0.068 (0.13) −0.334 (0.13)** 0.244 (0.16) −0.324 (0.14)** 0.273 (0.17) −0.328 (0.14)**
Medium-high tech manuf. 0.129 (0.29) −0.222 (0.29) −0.061 (0.34) −0.215 (0.30) −0.204 (0.27) −0.258 (0.28)
Medium-low tech manuf. −0.163 (0.29) −0.382 (0.29) −0.450 (0.35) −0.403 (0.29) −0.534 (0.27)* −0.412 (0.28)
R&D  services & software −0.146 (0.32) 0.273 (0.30) −0.139 (0.40) 0.266 (0.29) −0.245 (0.35) 0.261 (0.29)
Other  services 0.072 (0.31) −0.097 (0.31) −0.755 (0.40)* −0.136 (0.31) −0.765 (0.35)** −0.137 (0.31)
R&D  expend. (yes/no) 0.504 (0.18)*** 0.426 (0.21)** 0.349 (0.19)* 0.436 (0.21)** 0.499 (0.20)** 0.423 (0.22)*
R&D staff (in %) 0.387 (0.36) 0.693 (0.33)** 0.742 (0.44)* 0.829 (0.32)*** −0.162 (0.44) 0.643 (0.33)*
CEO has a degree 0.198 (0.14) 0.365 (0.17)** −0.180 (0.16) 0.354 (0.17)** −0.188 (0.17) 0.352 (0.17)**
Market size 0.263 (0.08)*** 0.190 (0.09)** 0.335 (0.10)*** 0.201 (0.09)** 0.301 (0.10)*** 0.204 (0.09)**
Product dev. time 0.166 (0.06)*** 0.037 (0.07) 0.137 (0.06)** 0.053 (0.07) 0.118 (0.07) 0.042 (0.07)
Competitors (log) −0.127 (0.06)** −0.087 (0.08) −0.131 (0.06)** −0.085 (0.08) −0.215 (0.07)*** −0.073 (0.07)
Intercept −3.096 (0.46)*** −1.831 (0.45)*** −2.354 (0.53)*** −1.889 (0.43)*** −2.482 (0.51)*** −1.888 (0.43)***
Observations 940 940 940
Log-likelihood −489.7 −459.4 −399.7
Chi-sq. test 348.2 295.7 369.9
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000
(vit ,ωit) 0.567 0.484 0.530
p-Value for  (Wald test) 0.011 0.091 0.001
Pseudo-R2 0.313 0.355 0.439
Notes. This table presents bivariate recursive probit models for patent applications, patent grants and for the likelihood of observing venture capital investments. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
Table 9
Patenting, patent numbers, and VC investment—Adjusted for M&A.
Dependent variable in patenting equations Applications in t + 1 Grants in t + 1 Grants in t + 1
Model 1 2 3
Dependent variable Not patenting
(zero inﬂation)
VC investment Not patenting
(zero inﬂation)
VC investment Not patenting
(zero inﬂation)
VC investment
VC investment 0.942 (0.65) −0.435 (0.58) −0.295 (0.81)
Patent applications (log) −0.257 (0.36) −0.088 (0.09) −0.413 (0.21)** −0.095 (0.09)
Patent  applications > 0 −2.406 (0.98)** 0.583 (0.20)*** −2.508 (0.57)*** 0.590 (0.21)***
Patent grants (log) −0.539 (0.18)*** −0.169 (0.11)
Patent grants > 0 −1.130 (0.25)*** 0.421 (0.22)*
Age (log) −0.116 (0.16) −0.352 (0.10)*** −0.137 (0.11) −0.342 (0.09)*** −0.046 (0.15) −0.332 (0.09)***
Size (log(employees + 1)) −0.255 (0.13)** 0.203 (0.07)*** −0.012 (0.08) 0.208 (0.07)*** −0.020 (0.10) 0.204 (0.07)***
U.S. ﬁrm 0.181 (0.27) −0.329 (0.13)** −0.345 (0.17)** −0.313 (0.14)** −0.251 (0.24) −0.323 (0.14)**
Medium-high tech manuf. −0.218 (0.52) −0.217 (0.29) 0.001 (0.44) −0.144 (0.29) 0.178 (0.40) −0.243 (0.28)
Medium-low tech manuf. 0.173 (0.54) −0.377 (0.29) 0.471 (0.45) −0.358 (0.29) 0.578 (0.41) −0.416 (0.28)
R&D  services & software 0.052 (0.59) 0.276 (0.30) 0.177 (0.51) 0.319 (0.30) −0.075 (0.45) 0.253 (0.29)
Other  services −0.666 (0.66) −0.098 (0.31) 0.791 (0.50) −0.085 (0.31) 0.902 (0.57) −0.148 (0.30)
R&D  expend. (yes/no) −0.821 (0.34)** 0.422 (0.21)** −0.395 (0.22)* 0.440 (0.21)** −0.608 (0.32)* 0.414 (0.21)*
R&D staff (in %) 0.325 (0.68) 0.703 (0.33)** −0.496 (0.53) 0.877 (0.32)*** 1.085 (0.63)* 0.674 (0.33)**
CEO has a degree −0.486 (0.27)* 0.350 (0.17)** 0.210 (0.20) 0.323 (0.17)* 0.274 (0.24) 0.336 (0.17)**
Market size −0.405 (0.16)** 0.188 (0.09)** −0.288 (0.12)** 0.208 (0.09)** −0.396 (0.17)** 0.204 (0.09)**
Product dev. time −0.246 (0.11)** 0.038 (0.07) −0.143 (0.08)* 0.052 (0.07) −0.215 (0.12)* 0.040 (0.07)
Competitors (log) 0.178 (0.10)* −0.090 (0.08) 0.140 (0.08)* −0.083 (0.07) 0.189 (0.12) −0.076 (0.08)
Intercept 4.270 (0.92)*** -1.815 (0.44)*** 2.386 (0.62)*** −1.936 (0.44)*** 2.680 (0.70)*** −1.885 (0.44)***
Dependent variable Patents (number) Patents (number) Patents (number)
VC investment −0.224 (0.42) 0.466 (0.21)** 0.076 (0.20)
Patent applications (Log) 0.922 (0.09)*** 0.935 (0.07)***
Patent applications > 0 −0.444 (0.34) −0.651 (0.32)**
Patent grants (log) 0.580 (0.07)***
Patent grants > 0 0.607 (0.20)***
Age (log) −0.061 (0.14) −0.281 (0.11)*** 0.071 (0.12)
Size  (log(employees + 1)) −0.050 (0.08) 0.201 (0.08)** 0.025 (0.12)
U.S.  ﬁrm 0.422 (0.25)* −0.017 (0.19) 0.217 (0.17)
Medium-high tech manuf. −0.037 (0.65) 0.053 (0.69) 0.383 (0.43)
Medium-low tech manuf. 0.108 (0.72) 0.366 (0.71) 0.579 (0.42)
R&D  services & software −0.415 (0.58) −0.196 (0.72) −0.111 (0.43)
Other services −1.100 (0.81) −0.091 (0.77) 0.223 (0.87)
R&D  expend. (yes/no) 0.203 (0.61) −0.396 (0.39) 0.352 (0.67)
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Table  9 (Continued)
Dependent variable Patents (number) Patents (number) Patents (number)
R&D staff (in %) 0.930 (0.33)*** 0.755 (0.29)** 0.877 (0.33)***
CEO has a degree −0.240 (0.22) −0.174 (0.34) −0.066 (0.22)
Market size −0.040 (0.09) 0.258 (0.11)** −0.147 (0.13)
Product  dev. time 0.051 (0.05) 0.035 (0.07) −0.050 (0.08)
Competitors (log) −0.095 (0.05)* 0.025 (0.12) −0.252 (0.12)**
Intercept 0.526 (0.75) 0.043 (0.77) 0.106 (0.71)
Var(ωit) 1.396 (0.26)*** 0.594 (0.09)*** 0.493 (0.08)***
(vit ,εit) −0.625 (0.14)*** −0.136 (0.27) −0.353 (0.36)
(vit ,ωit) 0.018 (0.06) −0.379 (0.06)*** −0.311 (0.03)***
Observations 940 940 940
Wald  test 18828 20622 17408
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log-likelihood −1002.1 −866.2 −786.5
Notes. This table presents zero-inﬂated Poisson models for patent applications and patent grants during the period following the survey period, including an endogenous
equation for venture capital investment. Robust standard errors (estimated using the sandwich estimator) are shown in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance levels: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
Table 10
Formal vs. informal venture capital.
Venture capital investment Informal VC investment
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent variable in patenting equation Applications in t + 1 Grants in t + 1 Grants in t + 1 Applications in t + 1 Grants in t + 1 Grants in t + 1
Patenting (yes/no)
VC investment −0.676 (0.45) −0.957 (0.82) −1.039 (1.13)
Informal VC investment −0.614 (0.77) 0.588 (0.87) −0.152 (0.49)
Patent applications (log) 0.468 (0.12)*** 0.538 (0.17)*** 0.488 (0.14)*** 0.585 (0.13)***
Patent applications > 0 1.057 (0.20)*** 1.601 (0.25)*** 1.031 (0.22)*** 1.636 (0.22)***
Patent grants (log) 0.476 (0.17)*** 0.598 (0.17)***
Patent grants > 0 1.179 (0.25)*** 1.208 (0.22)***
Age (log) 0.099 (0.08) −0.043 (0.13) 0.047 (0.16) 0.125 (0.08) 0.060 (0.10) 0.144 (0.09)
Size  (log(employees + 1)) 0.155 (0.06)*** 0.092 (0.08) 0.062 (0.10) 0.134 (0.06)** 0.049 (0.06) 0.003 (0.07)
U.S.  ﬁrm 0.071 (0.14) 0.188 (0.21) 0.265 (0.24) 0.086 (0.14) 0.335 (0.15)** 0.359 (0.18)**
Medium-high tech manuf. 0.079 (0.30) −0.178 (0.32) −0.340 (0.27) 0.176 (0.30) −0.118 (0.34) −0.191 (0.28)
Medium-low tech manuf. −0.233 (0.31) −0.538 (0.32)* −0.638 (0.27)** −0.138 (0.31) −0.486 (0.35) −0.492 (0.28)*
R&D services & software −0.171 (0.33) −0.127 (0.37) −0.243 (0.35) −0.135 (0.35) −0.201 (0.39) −0.234 (0.35)
Other  services 0.067 (0.32) −0.709 (0.40)* −0.759 (0.34)** 0.133 (0.33) −0.855 (0.40)** −0.757 (0.35)**
R&D expend. (yes/no) 0.456 (0.18)** 0.357 (0.19)* 0.471 (0.20)** 0.460 (0.19)** 0.267 (0.20) 0.447 (0.21)**
R&D staff (in %) 0.336 (0.34) 0.870 (0.41)** −0.013 (0.49) 0.264 (0.36) 0.693 (0.45) −0.214 (0.43)
CEO  has a degree 0.110 (0.14) −0.166 (0.16) −0.210 (0.18) 0.134 (0.15) −0.273 (0.16)* −0.237 (0.18)
Market size 0.271 (0.09)*** 0.350 (0.09)*** 0.317 (0.11)*** 0.242 (0.09)*** 0.329 (0.11)*** 0.263 (0.11)**
Product dev. time 0.151 (0.06)** 0.121 (0.07)* 0.109 (0.07) 0.172 (0.06)*** 0.132 (0.07)* 0.130 (0.08)*
Competitors (log) −0.126 (0.06)** −0.122 (0.06)** −0.193 (0.08)** −0.121 (0.06)** −0.117 (0.07)* −0.207 (0.08)***
Intercept −3.129 (0.46)*** −2.166 (0.53)*** −2.352 (0.56)*** −3.223 (0.46)*** −2.434 (0.52)*** −2.567 (0.52)***
VC/Inf. VC investment
Patent applications (log) −0.070 (0.09) −0.082 (0.09) −0.269 (0.10)*** −0.264 (0.10)***
Patent applications > 0 0.701 (0.22)*** 0.749 (0.27)*** 0.583 (0.24)** 0.600 (0.23)**
Patent grants (log) −0.054 (0.12) −1.212 (0.38)***
Patent grants > 0 0.507 (0.25)** 0.457 (0.32)
Age  (log) −0.337 (0.11)*** −0.318 (0.10)*** −0.326 (0.10)*** −0.318 (0.13)** −0.354 (0.12)*** −0.330 (0.13)***
Size (log(employees + 1)) 0.250 (0.07)*** 0.267 (0.08)*** 0.269 (0.07)*** 0.036 (0.09) 0.049 (0.09) 0.032 (0.09)
U.S.  ﬁrm −0.265 (0.16)* −0.282 (0.16)* −0.287 (0.16)* −0.354 (0.17)** −0.341 (0.17)* −0.341 (0.17)**
Medium-high tech manuf. −0.437 (0.31) −0.479 (0.35) −0.493 (0.34) 0.206 (0.50) 0.328 (0.53) 0.223 (0.49)
Medium-low tech manuf. −0.501 (0.33) −0.564 (0.33)* −0.556 (0.32)* 0.062 (0.51) 0.155 (0.52) 0.097 (0.49)
R&D  services & software 0.123 (0.33) 0.091 (0.33) 0.095 (0.33) 0.491 (0.49) 0.542 (0.51) 0.547 (0.48)
Other  services −0.070 (0.34) −0.176 (0.34) −0.145 (0.34) 0.276 (0.52) 0.362 (0.54) 0.303 (0.51)
R&D  expend. (yes/no) 0.352 (0.24) 0.350 (0.25) 0.350 (0.27) 0.664 (0.29)** 0.703 (0.30)** 0.691 (0.30)**
R&D staff (in %) 0.835 (0.35)** 0.868 (0.33)*** 0.765 (0.36)** 0.012 (0.46) 0.318 (0.46) −0.012 (0.45)
CEO  has a degree 0.122 (0.19) 0.105 (0.20) 0.110 (0.19) 0.622 (0.22)*** 0.625 (0.22)*** 0.636 (0.22)***
Market size 0.344 (0.10)*** 0.357 (0.11)*** 0.366 (0.10)*** −0.016 (0.11) −0.022 (0.10) −0.004 (0.11)
Product dev. time −0.011 (0.08) −0.002 (0.08) −0.016 (0.09) 0.138 (0.08)* 0.175 (0.08)** 0.142 (0.08)*
Competitors (log) −0.084 (0.08) −0.080 (0.08) −0.081 (0.09) −0.049 (0.09) −0.079 (0.10) −0.036 (0.09)
Intercept −2.342 (0.52)*** −2.372 (0.53)*** −2.431 (0.51)*** −2.152 (0.68)*** −2.171 (0.68)*** −2.237 (0.66)***
Observations 940 940 940 940 940 940
Log-likelihood −425.3 −396.6 −333.1 −391.7 −350.6 −297.0
Chi-sq.  test 338.5 312.7 336.6 303.9 270.3 370.7
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(vit ,εit) 0.524 0.756 0.735 0.354 0.140 0.382
p-Value for  (Wald test) 0.038 0.320 0.421 0.387 0.737 0.019
Pseudo-R2 0.378 0.382 0.481 0.319 0.342 0.443
Notes. This table presents zero-inﬂated Poisson models for patent applications and patent grants during the period following the survey period, including an endogenous
equation for venture capital investment. Robust standard errors (estimated using the sandwich estimator) are shown in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance levels: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
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function of patents. Interestingly, while such investors are attracted
to patent-active ﬁrms, they show only weak sensitivity to the num-
ber of patents, which might again indicate a preference for focus16 H. Lahr, A. Mina / Resea
ormal or informal VC investments show no substantial differences
etween the reactions of the two to patent signals. At this stage,
his remains an interesting question for further investigation.
.4. Identiﬁcation and alternative control variables
Estimation results for the patenting equations in our bivariate
nd trivariate models depend on the correct speciﬁcation of the
enture capital equation describing the selection of investments
y VC investors. We  test two alternative speciﬁcations to address
otential model misspeciﬁcation. First, we replace logarithmic age
nd size with quadratic speciﬁcations, as is customary in some
f the literature on small and medium-sized enterprises. Second,
e test our main models with two extra regressors in the venture
apital equation to strengthen identiﬁcation of the model.
When we re-run the models in Tables 3 and 4, all results for the
ffect of VC investment on patent applications and grants continue
o hold. Adding four extra terms to the bivariate model (squared
ge and size in both equations) and six new terms to the trivari-
te models may  be a cause for concern about over-speciﬁcation,
nd about whether these extra terms add explanatory power. A
irect comparison of quadratic speciﬁcations against the baseline
odels using Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) suggests that
uadratic speciﬁcations perform either as well as (in models with
atent grants) or worse (in models with patent applications) than
he baseline model with logarithmic controls.
Models identiﬁed by functional form, such as the simultaneous
odels tested in this paper, may  be sensitive to error terms’ devi-
tions from normality. An exclusion restriction in the patenting
quation(s) can help to identify the coefﬁcients in the model, if a
ariable can be found that explains VC investment but not patent-
ng outcomes. The survey dataset used in this paper includes two
uch variables. Respondents are asked on a ﬁve-point Likert scale
hether they expect the ﬁrm’s turnover will be smaller or larger
n ten years’ time, and a similar question is asked about the ﬁrm’s
arket value. When we add both variables measuring expectations
bout future growth to the VC equations in Tables 3 and 4, they
ointly explain VC at the 5% signiﬁcance level, which is plausible
iven that high-growth ﬁrms are likely investment targets of VC
unds. A ﬁrm’s patenting behaviour is not expected to be driven by
rowth options, but rather by the appropriability of its technology
nd the indicators for market structure that we use in our models.
esults including these two regressors in the VC equation are qual-
tatively identical to our main results. Almost all coefﬁcients that
ere originally signiﬁcant at the 5% level remain signiﬁcant at that
evel. Only two differences can be found: market size in the patent-
ng equation in model 1 in Table 3 and product development time
n model 1 in Table 4 are both now signiﬁcant at the 10% level. We
onclude that our results are robust against the two  risks of model
isspeciﬁcation tested here13.
. Conclusion
The mechanisms by which ﬁrms signal their quality to investors
hrough patents and how venture capital funds inﬂuence these
rms’ patenting behaviours have been studied in the literature, but
ave rarely been linked to one another. We  argue that, as ﬁrms’
atenting activities might depend on venture capitalists’ decisions
o invest based on patent signals, these two decisions should be
nvestigated simultaneously instead of separately. In this paper,
e model ﬁrms’ patenting behaviours explicitly allowing for the
ndogeneity of VC investments. Incorporating investors’ decisions
13 The results from all these robustness tests are available from the authors on
equest.licy 45 (2016) 303–318
into a simultaneous model is necessary to disentangle investment
selection from technological value-adding (or coaching) effects.
In contrast to the ﬁndings of studies on aggregate patenting
and VC investment, we ﬁnd that the causal link between VC and
patenting is weak, at best. A positive effect can only be found if
the potential endogeneity of VC ﬁnancing is ignored. Instead, we
ﬁnd that VC even exerts a negative inﬂuence on investee ﬁrms’
future patent applications and grants. This suggests that, by limiting
the dispersion of inventive efforts that often characterise inex-
perienced ﬁrms, venture capitalists help portfolio companies to
rationalise their technology searches and focus on the opportuni-
ties with the highest commercial potential. This result is plausible
and compatible with the expectations of behavioural theories of the
ﬁrm that take into account the cognitive limitations of economic
agents and stress the importance of the allocation of resources
– such as managerial attention – to selected aspect of the busi-
ness (Simon, 1947; Weick, 1979; Ocasio, 1997, 2011). A small but
growing ﬁrm may  have developed valuable IP and attracted exter-
nal ﬁnance on this basis—but, at this point, a trade-off emerges
between sustaining or increasing the level of knowledge creation
activities (invention) and capitalizing on existing assets. This can
include commercialisation activities such as marketing, or opera-
tional activities such as the scaling up of production. Evidence of
unchanged or decreasing technological output after VC investment
can therefore be interpreted as a positive development for the ﬁrm’s
growth prospects. Venture capitalists do not contribute to a ﬁrm’s
growth by augmenting its inventive potential: the ﬁrm in which
they invest is already good at generating new knowledge, which is
why they have selected it (on the basis of patent signals). This is
also compatible with the view that venture capitalists are ‘impa-
tient’ investors: they can come in after initial R&D costs have been
sunk and negotiate with cash poor and knowledge rich ﬁrms with
an emphasis on later stage and more tangible outputs14.
Venture capital investments affect ﬁrms’ growth paths by re-
orienting their resources towards the exploitation of existing
technological knowledge: hey act as focusing devices in the pro-
cess of entrepreneurial growth. Is it possible that venture capitalists
might want to increase the ﬁrm’s knowledge stock to increase its
liquidation value should the business fail? Evidence from a recent
survey of US venture capitalists, run by the National Venture Cap-
ital Association, conﬁrms that this is indeed not the objective of
investors (Feldman, 2013), aligning strongly with our results.
When we  consider the co-determinants of patenting, we  ﬁnd
that ﬁrm size is positively related to future patent applications.
R&D efforts measured by the existence of R&D expenses and the
percentage of R&D staff are highly signiﬁcant. Where Baum and
Silverman (2004) ﬁnd mixed evidence for an age effect on applica-
tions and grants, we decompose this effect into a non-signiﬁcant
one on the likelihood to patent, and a potentially negative one
on the number of grants obtained. We  ﬁnd that having an R&D
programme determines whether a ﬁrm patents at all, while the
proportion of scientiﬁc staff explains the number of patent appli-
cations and grants. Finally, the effect of industry competition on the
intensity of patenting is negative, and product development times
and market size are both positive predictors of patenting activity.
VC funds select portfolio companies based on the signalling14 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing us on this issue and for
suggesting the alternative explanation. The problem of VC as ‘impatient capital’ has
been recently discussed by Mazzucato (2013) and Crafts and Hughes (2013). The
stage distribution of VC investments is analysed in some detail by Lahr and Mina
(2014).
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ather than (possibly over-dispersed) search activities. By mod-
lling the venture capitalists’ decision to invest and the portfolio
ompany’s patenting activity simultaneously, we ﬁnd that patent-
ng has much sharper effects on VC investments than the other way
ound. The coaching function of VC concerns the commercialisation
f a ﬁrm’s existing patents or contributes to the rationalisation of its
atenting activities. This also indicates that, in this context, innova-
ion – interpreted as the Schumpeterian application of invention to
arket need – may  be promoted not by more, but by less patenting
fter external investment.
From a technical viewpoint, our models greatly reduce the
hances that selection by venture capitalists might drive a change in
bserved patenting behaviours, because estimating the correlation
etween the error terms in both equations controls for unobserved
imultaneous variance in VC ﬁnancing and patenting. If VC reacts
o some unobserved company characteristic that can be subsumed
ithin the error term of the switching equation, this unobserved
eterogeneity is taken into account when estimating the outcome
odel for patenting activity. Error correlations between the ven-
ure capital and patenting equations are signiﬁcant and substantial,
hich supports our estimation strategy and further strengthens the
ase for this study’s methodological approach. Further research –
ossibly with larger samples, while controlling for selection effects
 could generate additional quantitative evidence on the effect of
 VC’s coaching function on different aspects – or stages – of the
echnology life cycle. This may  also include identifying implica-
ions for short and long-run ﬁrm performance, conditional on the
oint dynamics of patenting and ﬁnancing.
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